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Act of state and sovereign immunity questions continue to
dominate the international law cases, as they have in recent years,
but not to the exclusion of other points of interests.
Act of State Doctrine and Sovereign Immunity-Counterclaim
against Plaintiff Government
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New York
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First National City Bank of New
York, Docket 60 Civ. 4664 (S.D.N.Y.), the District Court (a) re-
fused to give extraterritorial effect to Cuban decrees expropriating
deposits of various Cuban banks in the New York branch of First
National City Bank, (b) held that Cuba's expropriation of First Na-
tional City's Cuban branches violated international law, and (c) al-
lowed First National City a defensive setoff (but not an affirmative
counterclaim in excess of plaintiff's claim) against Banco Nacional
based on Cuba's duty to pay (and First National City's right to receive)
compensation for the taking of the latter's properties in Cuba.
Banco Nacional de Cuba, as the financial agent of the Govern-
ment of Cuba, had sued the First National City Bank of New York on
two claims: "the first for the excess realized by First National City
on the sale of collateral held as security for a loan, and the second
for deposits by nationalized Cuban banks in First National City in
New York." (Slip Op. 2.)
I. The First Claim: Setoff Based on Violation of International Law
The first claim arose from a one-year loan of $15 million
originally made on July 8, 1958, by First National City to a "govern-
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mental corporate agency of the Republic of Cuba," secured by United
States Government bonds and obligations of the World Bank. This
was renewed for another year on July 8, 1959, with the Republic of
Cuba guaranteeing repayment. On July 7, 1960, Banco Nacional
curtailed the loan by $5 million, with a proportionate share of col-
lateral being released, the balance of $10 million being due one year
later. The court summarized the events which followed less than three
months later:
September 16, 1960, however, marked the date of an
irreparable breach of the relationship between these parties.
On that day the Cuban militia seized all eleven of First National
City's branches located in Cuba. On the following day the
issuance of Executive Power Resolution No. 2 left no uncertainty
as to the permanent nature of these confiscations; under the
terms of the resolution the Cuban State was declared 'sub-
rogated' to all of First National City's rights, obligations,
and liabilities.
In the light of this turn of events First National City, on
September 23, 1960, sold the collateral it held as security for the
unpaid portion of the loan and applied the proceeds in payment
of the principal obligation and accrued interest. Defendant
concedes-and plaintiff for purposes of this motion does not
deny-that the amount realized on the sale of collateral ex-
ceeded by $1,810,880.51 the ten million dollars of unpaid
principal and the $65,000 interest then due. The first claim
for relief seeks judgment for the amount of the excess. (Slip
Op. 3-4.)
The court described the legal issues as follows:
The ultimate legal issues on the first claim are clearly
drawn. Banco Nacional strenuously contends that the affirma-
tive counterclaim and the set-off by way of defense are barred,
alternatively, by principles of sovereign immunity and the act of
state doctrine. The dispositive question is simply whether de-
fendant is precluded on those grounds from asserting-either
affirmatively or by way of set-off as a complete defense-a
claim for the value of its confiscated Cuban properties. (Slip
Op. 5.)
Sovereign Immunity
Noting that "[t]here is no serious question that the Government
of Cuba and Banco Nacional are one and the same for purposes
of this litigation," the court held:
. .. as a general rule a state which initiates proceedings in a
court of another sovereignty waives immunity from a counter-
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claim or set-off to the extent that it does not exceed the amount
of the state's claims. . . . This waiver extends to defensive
counterclaims which do not arise out of the subject matter of
the claims of the state which initiated the action. . . . The
ultimate policy reason for this is simply that 'fairness has been
thought to require that when the sovereign seeks recovery, it be
subject to legitimate counterclaims against it.' . . .
So viewed, there is no doubt that the assertion of First
National City's defense counterclaim as a set-off is not barred
because plaintiff happens to be an instrumentality of the Cuban
government. (Slip Op. 5-7.)
As to First National City's affirmative counterclaim for an amount in
excess of Cuba's claims, the court held that:
[P]Iaintiff's limited waiver of immunity by instituting this suit
permits only the assertion of a defensive counterclaim that 'does
not exceed the amount of the state's claims.' (Slip Op. 7,
fn. 5.)
The Act of State Doctrine
Noting that
Under Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 298 (1964),
inquiry into the legality vel non of the expropriations here in-
volved would be foreclosed by the act of state doctrine ...
(Slip Op. 8),
the court held:
However, the holding in Sabbatino was for practical purposes
overruled by the Hickenlooper amendment . . . , the consti-
tutionality of which has been upheld. Banco Nacional v. Farr,
243 F.Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). (Slip Op. 8.)
The ultimate act of state doctrine issues boils down to
whether the confiscations of First National City's Cuban prop-
erty violated principles of international law. In my view the
seizures here involved had precisely this effect for a combina-
tion of reasons.
In the first place the various decrees authorizing the con-
fiscations did not provide for adequate payments to First
National City. The scheme of 'illusory compensation' outlined
by Judge Waterman in Sabbatino. 307 F.2d at 862, has been
totally ineffective in practice in the intervening years. No com-
pensation whatsoever appears to have been forthcoming and
none can reasonably be expected in the foreseeable future.
(Slip Op. 9.)
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Noting that both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court
had "pointedly refrained" from deciding whether failure to compen-
sate, without more, constitutes a violation of international law, the
court stated:
But Congressional passage of the Hickenlooper Amendment has
removed any doubt on this score-at least insofar as the courts
of this country are concerned. While the reference to the 'prin-
ciples of compensation' in 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2) is somewhat
open-ended because it does not state specifically that compensa-
tion is a sine qua non of full compliance with international law,
subsection (1) of the same statute leaves no doubt as to the
views of Congress on the subject. . . . The legislative history
of the Hickenlooper amendment and its extensions is replete
with statements reaffirming what is plain on the face of the
legislation, i.e., that international law, at least from the parochial
point of view of the United States, requires full compensation for
seizures of American-owned property. (Slip Op. 9-10.)
The court explicitly held:
It is clear to me that this rule of compensation legislatively
announced by Congress is fully consistent with generally ac-
cepted principles of international law established by the authori-
ties reviewed by the appellate courts in Sabbatino. (Slip Op.
10-11.)
The final holding was stated by Judge Bryan as follows:
The totality of circumstances presented by this case-a
patent failure to provide adequate compensation, a retaliatory
confiscation by a foreign government, and discrimination against
United States nationals-compel a finding that the Cuban de-
cree directing confiscation of First National City's property was
in direct contravention of the principles of international law.
Thus First National City is entitled to set-off against the first
claim for relief such amount as may be due and owing to it from
the Cuban Government as compensation for the seized Cuban
properties, and I so hold. (Slip Op. 15-16.)
Concerning the Hickenlooper Amendment's proviso allowing
affirmative action by the President, the court stated:
The Sabbatino amendment is inapplicable 'in any case with
respect to which the President determines that application of the
act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the
foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to
this effect is filed on his behalf in that case with the court.' 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (2). However, since the Executive Branch
has maintained silence for the six years this action has been
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pending, it is clear that it has not determined that foreign policy
interests of the United States require application of the act of
state doctrine here. (Slip Op. 16, fn. 8.)
H. The Second Claim: Extraterritorial Effect Denied to Cuban Na-
tionalizations
Banco Nacional's second claim rested on its nationalization of
a number of Cuban banks which had some $33,812.93 on deposit
in New York with First National City Bank. The court stated:
The second claim for relief may be speedily disposed
of . ..
The short answer to this claim is simply that 'when prop-
erty confiscated is within the United States at the time of the
attempted confiscation, our courts will give effect to acts of
state "only if they are consistent with the policy and law of the
United States."' . . . The Cuban decree, like the attempted
confiscation of the accounts in Republic of Iraq, is plainly con-
trary to our policy and laws. It is not entitled to extraterritorial
enforcement in United States courts as to property located within
the United States. (Slip Op. 17.)
TAX EXEMPTION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT'S
PROPERTY
Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, New York Law Journal,
September 20, 1967 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1967)
The Republic of Argentina sought to obtain tax-free status for
property in New York City used by its consul general, its aeronautical
mission, and, during part of the period involved, by its United Na-
tions mission. The court, apparently basing its decision upon princi-
ples stated in correspondence between New York City and the office
of the Legal Advisor to the Department of State, concluded that, in-
asmuch as there is no treaty between Argentina and the United States
in respect to this subject, local taxing authorities were not obliged to
extend the privilege of immunity to office space of the type in question.
Sovereign Immunity-Jure Gestionis
Ocean Transport Company, Inc. v. The Government of the Republic
of the Ivory Coast and the Fishing Vessel President Kennedy, 269
F. Supp. 703 (E.D. La. 1967)
Plaintiff was hired by the Government of the Ivory Coast to sail
a training vessel, purchased with AID funds, to, Abidjan for a fixed
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fee plus a stipulated amount for each day that the vessel might have
to lay over for repairs. Upon leaving New Orleans the captain dis-
covered that the vessel was unseaworthy and put into Key West,
Florida, where the vessel remained. Plaintiff sued on its contract-
against the Ivory Coast in personam and in rem against the vessel-
and defendant government moved to dismiss on the basis of sovereign
immunity, a claim that the State Department declined to recognize
by issuing a request for immunity.
The Court, referring to the Tate Letter as supplemented in 1959
by Loftus Becker, decided that the governmental contract involved
was private in nature (jure gestionis) and that, since jurisdiction had
been obtained through attachment of property of defendant govern-
ment, the motion to dismiss would be denied. The Court refrained,
however, from ruling upon the question of whether execution upon
the defendant's attached property would be permitted to satisfy any
eventual judgment.
Sovereign Immunity
French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 27 A.D. 2d 530, 275 N.Y.S. 2d
567 (1st Dept. 1966)
In 1957, pursuant to Cuban legislation designed to attract foreign
investment capital, plaintiff brought into Cuba $345,000, which was
properly registered, and received certificates entitling him to obtain
from the Banco Nacional de Cuba U.S. dollar funds payable in New
York upon delivery of the equivalent amount of Cuban pesos and
surrender of the certificates. In December 1959 plaintiff presented to
defendant the proper amount in pesos together with certificates calling
for a total of $150,000; however, his demand for dollars was refused
pursuant to Decision 346 of the Cuban Currency Stabilization Fund.
The trial court found for plaintiff.
On appeal, the trial court was upheld by New York's Appellate
Division in a 3-2 decision. The dissenting judges agreed with the
trial court's determination that defendant was not performing a
governmental function in relation to the certificates and therefore was
not entitled to sovereign immunity. However, they stated that the out-
come of the case depended upon the trial court's finding that Decision
346 was defective in its promulgation and that it conflicted with the
Fundamental Law of Cuba in that it retroactively annulled a con-
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tract obligation; that these matters relate exclusively to acts performed
by the Cuban Government wholly within its own territory; and that a
United States court is not free to question them.
Laws and Customs of War-Act of State Doctrine
Menzel v. List, 28 A.D. 2d 516, 279 N.Y.S. 2d 608 (1st Dept. 1967),
modifying and affirming 49 Misc. 2d 300, 267 N.Y.S. 2d 804
Plaintiff purchased a Marc Chagall painting in Brussels for
$150 in 1932. When the German armies invaded Belgium in World
War II plaintiff fled her home leaving the painting behind. The lo-
cation of the painting between 1941 and 1955 is unknown but the
evidence indicated that in March 1941 the painting was removed
from plaintiff's residence by the "Nazi Goering-Rosenberg Group."
In 1955 defendant List bought the painting for $4,000 from the
third-party defendant, a New York art gallery which had acquired
the painting that year from a French art dealer. The jury in a replevin
action fixed the value of the painting at $22,500 and reached a verdict
requiring defendant List to deliver the painting or $22,500 to plaintiff
and further providing that List recover $22,500 from the third-party
defendant.
On appeal the award of the lower court was modified to reduce
the amount awarded in favor of the third-party plaintiff (List) against
the third-party defendant to $4,000 plus interest from 1955.
The arguments of law raised on behalf of defendants appear
from the following summary of the court's rulings:
1. The statute of limitations-whether it be regarded as re-
ferring to the lapse of time since 1941 or since 1955-
does not bar the replevin action since it did not arise until
defendant refused to convey the painting upon demand.
As to the third-party defendant the statute is no bar since
the third-party complaint was based upon the warranty
of quiet possession, which was not breached until possession
of the painting by defendant List was disturbed.
2. The defense of abandonment by the plaintiff of her owner-
ship of the painting is inapplicable since abandonment is a
voluntary act and plaintiff's flight for her life was no more
voluntary than relinquishing property during a holdup.
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Further, plaintiff's search thereafter for the painting demon-
strated a continuing intent to reclaim it.
3. The painting was not lawful booty of war taken by conquer-
ing armies since booty is defined as property, such as food
and means of transportation, that is necessary and indispens-
able for the conduct of a war. The painting was, in fact,
pillaged or plundered private property.
4. The act-of-state doctrine does not apply because (a) the
taking was not by a branch of the German government but
rather by an organ of the Nazi party, (b) the taking was
not within the territorial limits of Germany, (c) the govern-
ment of the Third Reich was not recognized by the United
States at the time of this lawsuit, and (d) the taking was in
violation of the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the Laws
and Customs of Wars on Land.
The so-called Bernstein "Exception" to the act-of-state
doctrine was not regarded by the court as relevant in view
of its determination that the doctrine itself had no applica-
tion to the case.
5. It is of no moment that the third-party defendant may have
been a bona fide purchaser of the painting, in good faith
and for value. The basic principle of law is that a thief con-
veys no title as against the true owner.
Sabbatino Revisited
On July 31, 1967, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit for the second time unanimously affirmed the
District Court's dismissal of the complaint in the Sabbatino Case,
now known as Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, Docket 30341,
pointing out:
This action, which has served as the test case 1 for litigation
concerning Cuban expropriations, involves the disposition of the
proceeds of the sale of a cargo of sugar which was expropriated
by the Castro government while the cargo was in Cuban terri-
torial waters. (Slip Op. 3183.)
On remand from the Supreme Court's reversal (376 U.S. 398),
the lower courts were faced with the Hickenlooper Amendment or
1 Footnote mentioning 35 pending cases omitted.
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Rule of Law Amendment, enacted on October 7, 1964, as Section
301 (d) (4) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Pub. L. 88-633,
78 Stat. 1009, 1013. The Second Circuit stated:
The district court in a scholarly and well-reasoned opin-
ion held that the Hickenlooper Amendment applied to the case
at bar, that the Amendment was constitutional, and that it was
bound by our prior determinations, 307 F.2d 845 (1962),
that the expropriation by the Cuban government violated inter-
national law. The same issues are raised before us, and in dis-
posing of them we reach the same result the lower court
reached. . . . (Slip Op. 3191.)
I. Applicability of the Hickenlooper Amendment
(A) Congressional Intent
Rejecting the Cuban argument that the Amendment did not apply
because it was enacted in 1964 while the expropriation occurred in
1960, the Second Circuit held that ". . it is well established that
when a statute specifically applies to past transactions, as the Hicken-
looper Amendment does, it applies to pending, cases too, because a
case must be decided according to the law as it exists at the time of
final judgment." (Slip Op. 3192.) While finding reference to legisla-
tive history unnecessary, the Second Circuit nevertheless reviewed it
and concluded it "contains nothing which would make us doubt our
conclusion based upon the unambiguous words of the statute."
(Slip Op. 3200.)
(B) The Supreme Court's Mandate
Rejecting the Cuban argument that the lower courts are bound
by the Supreme Court's mandate "despite any intervening event,"
the Second Circuit held that the mandate rule "should not be ex-
tended" to cover the "novel situation" of a "case involving the effect
on the rights of litigants of a federal statute, inconsistent with a
Supreme Court mandate, which became law after the Supreme Court
had remanded a case to the trial court but before the trial court had
acted upon the merits after the remand." (Slip Op. 3202.) "More-
over," said the Second Circuit, ". . . there may well be a constitu-
tional objection to an application of the mandate here." (Slip Op.
3203.)
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II. Constitutionality of the Hickenlooper Amendment
(A) Due Process
The Second Circuit rejected the Cuban argument that the
Amendment constitutes deprivation of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment. Refusing to characterize the act of state doctrine
as a "substantive" right, the court pointed out:
The Supreme Court's determination in appellant's favor is based
not on any recognition that appellant acquired enforceable
rights through the Cuban expropriation, but upon a judicial
policy of abstaining from an affirmative determination as to
those rights, an abstention held applicable to this case long after
the expropriation. (Slip Op. 3205.)
The court held:
The Hickenlooper Amendment thus does not affect appellant's
property rights based upon the expropriations nor create any
new rights or any new liabilities .... Its effect in this litiga-
tion has been similar to that of a successfully pleaded statute
of limitations by which a defendant obtains a judgment without
the merits of plaintiff's action ever having been reached. Con-
tinuing this analogy, it is well established that modification of
statutes of limitation does not create or destroy constitutionally
protected property rights in those affected by the changes. (Slip
Op. 3205.)
(B) Legislative Interference with Judicial Power
The court rejected Banco Nacional's contention that the Hicken-
looper Amendment was an unconstitutional exercise by Congress
violative of the proper separation of powers, and held:
The Supreme Court had to make its determination relative
to the applicability of the act of state doctrine with but little
guidance from the two political branches of the Government.
As the Constitution did not require the exact result reached there
the Court must have exercised its discretion, based on its own
judgment of the situation, to choose from among a number of
constitutionally permissible alternative rules as to the appli-
cability of the act of state doctrine. Therefore the political
branches of our national government should be able to modify
the Court's decision, choosing another constitutionally permis-
sible alternative, cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
441-42 (1944), especially as the factor upon which the choice
is based, the effect on our foreign relations, is admittedly more
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within the competence of the political branches of the Govern-
ment than the competence of the Court. (Slip Op. 3208-9.)
The Second Circuit also pointed out:
• . . the Supremacy Clause may require a judicial surrender to
the will of Congress in situations which present no constitutional
impediment to judicial surrender. (Slip Op. 3209.)
(c) Legislative Interference with Executive Power
Rejecting Banco Nacional's claim that the President has the
"very delicate, plenary and exclusive power" in the conduct of foreign
relations, the Second Circuit noted that the Supreme Court in Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918), had found that the
Constitution commits foreign relations "to the Executive and Legisla-
tive . . . Departments" (emphasis supplied), and that the Congress'
authority in Article I, § 8, clauses 3, 10 and 18 ". . . is sufficient
justification for the assertion of congressional power in this situation."
(Slip Op. 3211.) The court also noted that the Hickenlooper Amend-
ment was signed by the President, and that the Justice Department,
as amicus curiae in the District Court, argued for its constitutionality.
III. Seizures As Violation of International Law
Rejecting Banco Nacional's argument that the Cuban seizures
did not violate international law, the Second Circuit quoted its
previous holding that "the decree was in violation of international law.
307 F.2d at 868." (Slip Op. 3212-13), and held that this holding
''was unaffected when the Supreme Court reversed the result we
had reached." (Slip Op. 3213.)
Noting that the Hickenlooper Amendment "requires us to judge
the taking here by principles of international law 'including the
principles of compensation and other standards set out in this subsec-
tion [22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)],'" the Second Circuit held:
It is clear that if these domestic statutory standards are different
from the international law standards which we applied when we
decided this case formerly, the statutory standards tend to
be more exacting upon the expropriating nations. As we held
that the taking before us violated international law under the
possibly less exacting standards which we then applied, the ap-
plication of the new statutory standards would not affect our
decision here. This allows us to leave undecided whether the
standard set forth in the Hickenlooper Amendment differs from
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the standard which we applied on the former appeal, and which
we now apply again. It also allows us to avoid the question of
whether Congress can thus specify how our United States courts
must decide questions of international law, though 'The Con-
gress shall have Power . . . To define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the
Law of Nations,' U.S. Const. Art. I, §8, cl. 10 (emphasis sup-
plied), see Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank
(SDNY July 25, 1967). (Slip Op. 3215-16.)
Inheritance By Aliens
Estate of Chichernea, 57 Cal. Rptr. 135, 424 P. 2d 687 (1967)
Nonresident aliens under California's probate statute bear the
burden of establishing that the laws of their country grant United
States citizens the "reciprocal right . . . to take . . . property upon
the same terms and conditions" as nationals of that country. Residents
of Rumania sued to prevent the State of California from escheating to
itself property willed to them by a California resident. The State con-
tended that Rumanian law did not accord such a reciprocal right.
After reviewing "a wealth of learned opinion [and] an impos-
ing array of specific case histories," the Supreme Court of California
ruled in favor of Rumanian residents. The court was satisfied that
Rumanian law's "national regime" concept accords to aliens equal
treatment with Rumanian nationals. Specifically, the court found
that nonresident aliens in Rumania enjoy all "civil rights other than
those from which they have been formally excluded" and that this
principle is so deeply rooted that it applies regardless of whether
a Rumanian citizen enjoys the same rights in the alien's country. The
court reiterated its holding in Estate of Larkin, 52 Cal. Rptr. 441,
416 P. 2d 473 (1966), that proof of a nation's actual practice may
be sufficient to establish reciprocity despite the absence of any explicit
guaranty of equal treatment in that nation's laws. Observing that
''our statute is concerned not with the brooding omnipresence of
foreign law but with its specific provisions and their operation in
concrete situations," the court rejected the notion that such rights
as aliens might possess under Rumanian law were "privileges" which
the regime may choose to ignore in any given case.
The cout also reiterated a distinction made in the Larkin case
between conditions affecting the vesting of economic interests and
restrictions affecting only the transmission of funds. The existence
of the latter restrictions in Rumania does not render the interests of
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American beneficiaries of Rumanian estates economically negligible,
whereas the existence of the former conditions would. To hold
otherwise, the court asserted, would be to assure an unsettling effect
upon inheritance relations between California and many, perhaps
even most, of the world's nations.
Federal Jurisdiction-Violation of Treaty or Law of Nations
Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 259 F. Supp. 224 (E.D.
Pa. 1966)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 Federal District Courts have original
jurisdiction of "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
As a jurisdictional route for aliens, it has been generally obscured by
28 U.S.C. § 1332, which is based upon diversity of citizenship. In
this case, however, plaintiffs were unable to establish that the amount
in controversy exceeded $10,000; hence, apparently, they resorted to
Section 1350.
Section 1350 originated in the Judiciary Act of 1789, but author-
ity for its application is scarce. Khedivial Line S.A.E. v. Seafarers'
International Union, 278 F. 2d 49, 52 (2d Circ. 1950). In Valanga,
plaintiff, a non-resident Russian beneficiary under a life insurance
policy issued in the United States by an American company, con-
tended that Section 1350 was applicable where defendant company
refused to pay the proceeds on the policy. Defendant's motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or, in the alternative, to
stay the proceedings pending the outcome of a prior state court action
begun by plaintiff, was granted by the district court, which, although
doubting that the company's refusal'to pay the proceeds constituted a
tort at all, limited its decision to the holding that the refusal did not
constitute a violation of the law of nations or of a United States
treaty.
"A violation of the law of nations," said the court, "means a
violation of those standards by which nations regulate their dealings
with one another inter se." As an example of a case in which Section
1350 was properly invoked, the court cited Abdul-Rahman Omar
Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), a suit for custody of a
child brought by a Lebanese citizen who claimed that defendant was
taking the child from country to country on her own passport by falsi-
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fying the true nationality of the child, in violation of the laws of
Lebanon and the United States.
Webb-Pomerene Act-Interpretation of "Export Trade"
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n. Inc.,
F. Supp.- (S.D.N.Y. 1967)
The Webb-Pomerene Act exempts from the antitrust laws
agreements or acts in the course of export trade by an association
entered into for the sole purpose of engaging in such trade. It is de-
signed to enable domestic companies to compete more effectively with
foreign cartels and to resist the pressures of foreign buying combina-
tions. It does not exempt anything "which artificially or intentionally
enhances or depresses prices within the United States. . ....
Five domestic fertilizer producers formed a non-profit corpora-
tion to engage in "export trade." The corporation, which was
registered with the Federal Trade Commission as an association
organized and acting under the Webb-Pomerene Act, served as a
selling agency for the concentrated phosphate products of its members.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held that
sales made by the association under the foreign aid program con-
stituted "export trade" inasmuch as the Korean Government was the
purchaser and the goods were sold for shipment to and use in Korea,
and despite the fact that United States Government agencies acted
as the procuring authority and exercised ultimate control over the
expenditure of foreign aid funds. The words "to export," the court
said, had at the time the Act was enacted the same meaning it has
now-"to carry or send abroad, especially to foreign countries."
On the face of the statute, the transactions were exempt from the
antitrust laws, the court held. That it might be unfair to the United
States Government, which paid for the fertilizer, to permit the compa-
nies to agree on selling prices, thereby depriving the Government of
price benefits that might accrue from competitive trade conditions
within the United States, did not alter this conclusion.
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